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Résumé / Abstract
On s'intéresse à la détermination du degré de spécialisation amont-aval
d'une industrie partiellement intégrée. La situation est modélisée de sorte à pouvoir
prendre en compte des différences persistantes de coût de production entre firmes en
amont, ce qui est typique de plusieurs industries de ressources naturelles. Le modèle
permet de faire ressortir les rôles respectifs des considérations stratégiques et des
considérations de coût dans la détermination de l'interaction d'une firme intégrée
avec le secteur non intégré de l'industrie et, de ce fait, la détermination de sa
spécialisation relative amont-aval. Des faits stylisés tirés de l'industrie pétrolière
mondiale viennent illustrer le type de comportement auquel on peut s'attendre dans
un tel contexte.
We propose a simple model of a partially integrated industry which
explicitly takes into account persistent production cost differences across
upstream firms, such as one might observe in natural resource industries. The
model allows us to highlight the respective roles of strategic considerations in
the determination of an integrated firm's interaction with the non-integrated
sector of the industry and, in the end, on its relative upstream-downstream
specialization. Stylized facts from the world oil industry are used to illustrate the
type of behaviour one might expect in this context.
Mots Clés : Firmes intégrées, spécialisation, interactions stratégiques
Keywords : Integrated Firms, Specialization, Strategic Interactions
1 Introduction
Studies of vertical integration have typically modelled the integration decision as a di-
chotomic decision where, although some rms may be integrated and some not, all integrated
rm behaves in the same way, as do all non-integrated rm
1
. For many industries this is a
reasonable simplication, since there is usually no reason to believe that either upstream or
downstream cost asymmetries can persist in the long run and there is therefore no a priori
justication for the integrated rms not to behave identically.
However, if there are persistent cost dierences amongst rms, then the relative upstream-
downstream specialization decision of each integrated rm should depend on its upstream-
downstream cost advantage. Natural resource industries provide notable examples of such
situations, for in those industries upstream costs are exogenously determined by nature and
usually dier between producers. It is well known for instance that crude oil production
costs | both the physical extraction costs and the opportunity cost due to the xed reserve
size | vary widely across producers. One would expect those inherent cost asymmetries to
result in asymmetric behavior on the part of integrated oil companies. The stylized facts
from the oil industry discussed in the next section seem to conrm those expectations.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the eect of upstream cost asymmetries on the
behavior of integrated rms. We propose a simple model of a partially integrated industry
which explicitly takes into account these upstream cost asymmetries. The model allows
us to highlight the respective roles of strategic considerations and of cost considerations in
the determination of an integrated rm's interaction with the non-integrated sector of the
industry and, in the end, on its relative upstream-downstream specialization.
To x the ideas, we will refer to the upstream stage as that of crude oil production and to
the downstream stage as that of oil rening. The model is however relevant to any partially
1
See for instance the papers by Bonanno and Vickers (1988), Gaudet and Long (1995), Hart and Tirole
(1990), Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990), Salinger (1988), as well as the survey by Perry (1989).
1
integrated two-stage natural resource industry
2
or, for that matter, any industry where
upstream production cost dierences are important and persistent, for whatever reason.
Before going on to discuss the model and its assumptions, we take a brief look in the next
section at some stylized facts taken from the world oil industry. These facts illustrate the
type of behaviour one can expect from integrated rms in a vertically related industry with
important upstream cost dierences across rms. We discuss the model and its assumptions
in section 3 and present the equilibrium strategies in section 4. In section 5, we characterize
the strategic and cost elements of an integrated rm's behaviour and derive from the model
some predictions as to the eects of costs asymmetries which may be easily related to the
facts presented in section 2. We oer a brief conclusion in section 6.
2 Some stylized factual evidence
As already noted in the introduction, dierentiated upstream costs are common in many
natural resource industries. This is well illustrated by the world oil industry. Although reli-
able published data on costs by individual oil producers are scarce, it is widely acknowledged
that upstream costs dier greatly across producers
3
.
One imperfect indicator of some of the costs for which reasonably reliable micro-data
is available is oil reserves. In many cases, the larger the reserves, the easier can the oil be
extracted. Hence the operating costs will often be inversely related to the size of reserves.
Just as important, however, is the fact that in an oligopolistic world the larger a rm's
reserves the lower its opportunity costs, in terms of foregone future prots, of extracting
the marginal barrel today rather than leaving it for future extraction
4
. For lack of direct
2
The model simplies the non renewable resource reality however, in that it neglects the dynamic aspects
of non renewable resource extraction. We believe nonetheless that the static model we propose is helpful
in gaining some insight into the problem and that this insight might be overshadowed in a dynamic model
which would explicitly take into account the non renewability constraints.
3
See for instance Adelman and Shahi (1989) who provide estimates of development-operating costs for a
number of oil producing nations (not companies) for the period 1955 to 1985.
4
This inverse relationship between a rm's reserves and its opportunity cost of extraction would of course
2
measures of upstream costs, let us therefore use reserves as a rough indicator of at least an
important part of those costs
5
.
Table 1 shows the data for oil production, rening capacity and oil reserves for the top
forty-six integrated oil producers in 1993, ranked by upstream production. Quite obviously,
reserves vary considerably, as do oil outputs and rening capacities. The third column of
Table 1 shows the ratio of rening capacity to upstream production (the second column
divided by the rst column). This variable can be considered a measure of the degree of
specialization of each company between upstream and downstream production. It also varies
greatly across rms.
In Figures 1 through 3, we have plotted the individual company ranks for respectively
upstream oil production, rening capacity and the ratio of rening capacity to production
against the ranks for reserves. In each case, a simple linear t is drawn through the data, as
a crude indicator of the direction of the relationship between the two variables. It appears
clearly from Figure 1 that the company with the larger reserves | and hence presumably the
lower upstream cost | also tends to have the greater upstream production
6
. Figure 2 shows
that a similar relationship holds for downstream production: the company with the lower
upstream cost tends to have the larger downstream production. However, as is apparent
from Figure 3, the company with the lower upstream cost will tend to have the lower ratio of
downstream to upstream production. This is true even though it has greater upstream and
downstream production than a company with a higher upstream costs. The implication is
not hold in a competitive market, where rms are price takers. In such a world, a redistribution of reserves
would not change the equilibrium extraction paths. But in a duopoly, for instance, the rm with the higher
reserves assigns it a lower shadow value in equilibrium and redistributing reserves in its favor increases its
shadow value and decreases that of the other rm (see Gaudet and Long (1994)). A redistribution of reserves
then matters because of the anticipated monopoly stage. This easily extends to an n-rm non renewable
resource oligopoly.
5
Adelman et al. (1991) estimate the value of a barrel of oil in the ground, based on data for the United
States, to be on average roughly half of the wellhead price net of operating cost, royalties, severance taxes
and excise taxes.
6
It may in fact be considered almost a truism that upstream production should be negatively related
to upstream production costs. In that sense then, Figure 1 could be viewed as simply a conrmation that
reserves may not be a bad indicator of costs.
3
that the integrated rm with the lower upstream production costs will tend to be relatively
more specialized in upstream production. This implication is drawn without any observations
on downstream costs. Unlike for upstream costs however, there is no a priori reason to believe
that, in the long run, those costs would dier very much across rms
7
.
In the following section, we propose a theoretical model of a partially integrated industry
which retains the essential elements necessary to provide some predictions and explanations
for the type of behaviour one might expect from rms operating in a context similar to the
one just described. As we will see, these are consistent with the above stylized facts.
3 The model
Consider two vertically related industries composed of a set N
u
= f1; 2; : : : ; n
u
g of upstream
producers | the crude oil producers | and a set N
d
= f1; 2; : : : ; n
d
g of downstream pro-
ducers | the oil reners. An integrated rm is one that controls the production of an
upstream-downstream pair and maximizes their joint prot. Let m denote the number of
such integrated rms. Obviously m  minfn
u
; n
d
g. We will assume n
u
 n
d
and hence
m  n
u
. We will denote by I
u
= fi 2 N
u
j i is integratedg the set of integrated upstream
producers and by J
u
= fj 2 N
u
j j is not integratedg the set of non integrated upstream
producers. Similarly I
d
= fi 2 N
d
j i is integratedg and J
d
= fj 2 N
d
j j is not integratedg
will denote respectively the set of integrated and of non-integrated downstream rms.
Downstream producers simply transform one unit of crude oil into one unit of rened
product. We will assume that they can all do so at the same constant marginal cost which,
for simplicity, we will take to be zero. Thus the only cost of producing a unit of rened
product is the cost of a unit of crude oil. Upstream oil production costs will be assumed to
vary across producers. The constant marginal cost of oil producer k 2 N
u
will be denoted
7
Of the forty-six companies retained in Table 1, twenty-two are fully state-owned and ve are partly
state-owned. However, Figures 1 through 3 look much the same if we restrict attention to the twenty-four
rms which are publicly traded.
4
ck
. Since downstream producers are identical, we may assume without loss of generality that
the integrated upstream producer k 2 I
u
is paired with the downstream rener k 2 N
d
and
we may therefore write I
u
= I
d
= I.
It will be convenient to denote by y
i
and by y
j
the quantity rened by respectively the
integrated rm i 2 I and the non-integrated rener j 2 J
d
. Similarly, x
i
and x
j
will represent
the upstream oil production of respectively the integrated rm i 2 I and the non-integrated
producer j 2 J
u
. The variable s
i
= x
i
  y
i
will capture integrated rm i's interrelation
with the market for crude oil. If s
i
is positive, then integrated rm i renes less than its
downstream oil production and supplies the rest, through the crude oil market, to the non-
integrated rening sector and the rening division of other integrated rms that wish to
rene more than they produce; if s
i
is negative, then it renes more than its own production
of crude, its rening division being supplied the rest, through the crude oil market, by the
non-integrated crude oil producers and the integrated rms that wish to rene less than they
produce.
We will denote by p the market price of the rened product and assume the market
demand to be linear, given by Y =   p, where Y =
P
k2N
d
y
k
. The equilibrium production
decisions are viewed as the result of a two-stage game. In the last (downstream) stage, rms
compete in quantities to simultaneously determine y
i
(8i 2 I) and y
j
(8j 2 J
d
), given the
market demand for the rened product. In doing so they act somewhat as followers, taking
as given the market price of crude oil, which we will denote w. Their equilibrium decisions
therefore yield the derived market demand for crude oil as an input in the rening process.
In the upstream stage, oil producers also compete a la Cournot to simultaneously determine
s
i
(8i 2 I) and x
j
(8j 2 J
u
), taking as given the derived demand schedule for crude oil
expected to result from the downstream stage rening decisions.
At rst thought, it might seem that an integrated rm would never wish to buy crude
oil from the crude oil market at a price which is not less than its own cost of producing
5
it, and therefore that s
i
could be restricted to being positive. There are two potential
reasons, to be further claried in the next section, why this is not the case. First, as already
noted, some integrated rms may have a cost disadvantage in crude oil production over
other integrated rms and may therefore wish to specialize, relatively speaking, in rening.
Second, and depending on the importance of the non-integrated versus the integrated sectors,
all integrated rms may nd it protable to buy from the crude oil market if in doing so they
can contribute to increasing the price of crude and hence the input cost of their dowstream
rivals, thereby making the rening industry less competitive
8
.
4 The equilibrium strategies
Since we seek a subgame perfect equilibrium, we rst solve for the downstream rening
decisions. In the downstream stage, an integrated rm chooses y
i
, the quantity to rene, in
order to maximize
(   Y )y
i
  c
i
y
i
+ (w   c
i
)s
i
(1)
which is the joint prot generated by its upstream and downstream divisions. However, what
matters at this stage for an integrated rm is really its prots from the rening operation,
since s
i
is an upstream decision, already determined.
The prot of a non-integrated rener, on the other hand, is given by
(   Y )y
j
 wy
j
(2)
which it wishes to maximize with respect to y
j
.
Since w is taken as given by each rener and since each is assumed to behave a la Cournot
8
Such raising rivals' costs equilibrium strategies when upstream costs are identical, and therefore all
integrated rms behave identically, are analyzed in more detail, with explicit examples being provided, in
Gaudet and Long (1995).
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in determining y
i
and y
j
, the set of rst-order conditions will be
   2y
i
  Y
i
= c
i
8i 2 I (3)
   2y
j
  Y
j
= w 8j 2 J
d
(4)
where Y
i
= Y   y
i
and Y
j
= Y   y
j
. Letting C
I
=
P
i2I
c
i
, the solution to (3) and (4) can be
written
y
i
=
 + C
I
n
d
+ 1
+
n
d
 m
n
d
+ 1
w   c
i
i 2 I (5)
y
j
=
 + C
I
n
d
+ 1
 
m+ 1
n
d
+ 1
w j 2 J
d
: (6)
from which we get
Y =
n
d
   C
I
+ (n
d
 m)w
n
d
+ 1
: (7)
Substituting into the inverse demand, we nd that the price of the rened product as a
function of the still to be determined market price for crude oil, w, is
p =
 + C
I
n
d
+ 1
+
n
d
 m
n
d
+ 1
w: (8)
In order for the market for crude oil to be in equilibrium, we must have
X
j2J
d
y
j
=
X
i2I
s
i
+
X
j2J
u
x
j
:
After substituting for the y
j
's from (6) we nd that the derived inverse market demand for
the upstream crude oil is given by
w =
1
m+ 1

 + C
I
 
n
d
+ 1
n
d
 m

S
I
+X
J
u


: (9)
7
where S
I
=
P
i2I
s
i
and X
J
u
=
P
j2J
u
x
j
.
Consider now the upstream stage. At that stage, oil producers face the inverse market
demand (9) in deciding how much oil to put on the market. In the case of an integrated rm
this consists in choosing s
i
, which gives its net position vis a vis the market. In doing so
it will aim at maximizing the joint prot from both its upstream and downstream position,
that is
(p   c
i
)y
i
+ (w   c
i
)s
i
; (10)
where now y
i
, p and w are given respectively by (5), (8) and (9). A non-integrated upstream
rm, on the other hand, determines x
j
, its total production of crude oil, in order to maximize
the prot from this single operation, which is simply
(w   c
j
)x
j
(11)
with w given by (9).
The equilibrium to this quantity competition a la Cournot is provided by the solution to
the set of rst-order conditions
"
(p  c
i
)
@y
i
@w
+ y
i
@p
@w
#
@w
@s
i
+ w + s
i
@w
@s
i
= c
i
8i 2 I (12)
w + x
j
@w
@x
j
= c
j
8j 2 J
u
; (13)
where, from (5),(8) and (9),
@y
i
@w
=
@p
@w
=
n
d
 m
n
d
+ 1
and
@w
@s
i
=
@w
@x
j
=  
n
d
+ 1
(m+ 1)(n
d
 m)
:
8
As is shown in the Appendix, the solution to (12) and (13) may be written
s
i
=
m  1
A
"
 + C
I
m+ 1
  c
i
#
 
B
mA
(S
I
+X
J
u
); i 2 I (14)
x
j
=
m+ 1
A
"
 + C
I
m+ 1
  c
j
#
  (S
I
+X
J
u
); j 2 J
u
(15)
and
S
I
+X
J
u
=
E + F
(n
u
 m+ 1)A+B
(16)
where
A =
n
d
+ 1
n
d
 m
B =
m(n
d
+ 1
n
d
 m
 
2m
m+ 1
E =
m(m  1)
m+ 1
 
  
C
I
m
!
F = (n
u
 m)
 
  
C
I
m
!
+ (m+ 1)

n
u
 m
m
C
I
  C
J
u

:
and C
J
u
=
P
j2J
u
c
j
.
Eliminating w by substituting from (9) into (5) and (6), we may write the equilibrium
productions of the rened product
y
i
=
 + C
I
m+ 1
 
S
I
+X
J
u
m+ 1
  c
i
; i 2 I (17)
y
j
=
S
I
+X
J
u
n
d
 m
; j 2 J
d
: (18)
Using (14) and (17) we also verify that the equilibrium production of crude oil by integrated
rm i is
x
i
= s
i
+ y
i
9
=
1 +
m  1
A

 
 + C
I
m+ 1
  c
i
!
 

1
m+ 1
 
B
mA


S
I
+X
J
u

; i 2 I: (19)
5 Some eects of cost asymmetries
The equilibrium solution just derived can now be used to characterize the eect of upstream
cost dierences on the behavior of integrated rms. To do this, consider two integrated rms,
say rms i and i
0
both elements of I, that dier only by their upstream cost of production.
We can immediately establish from (19) and (17) that
x
i
  x
i
0
=
(n
d
 m)(m  1) + n
d
+ 1
n
d
+ 1
(c
i
0
  c
i
); i; i
0
2 I
y
i
  y
i
0
= c
i
0
  c
i
; i; i
0
2 I
and hence
sign[x
i
  x
i
0
] =  sign[c
i
  c
i
0
]; i; i
0
2 I
sign[y
i
  y
i
0
] =  sign[c
i
  c
i
0
]; i; i
0
2 I:
Therefore, not too surprisingly, the lower the cost of production of crude oil of an inte-
grated rm, the more of it will produce. Since it has access to a relatively cheap source of
input, it will also rene a greater quantity than its higher cost rivals.
Of particular interest is the relative specialization of the two rms. As a measure of this,
consider the ratio of the quantity of oil rened to the quantity of crude oil produced by an
integrated rm:

i
=
y
i
x
i
= 1 
s
i
x
i
:
10
Then, at equilibrium,

i
  
i
0
=
x
i
s
i
0
  x
i
0
s
i
x
i
x
i
0
=
(m+ 1)(S
I
+X
J
u
)(c
i
  c
i
0
)
(n
d
+ 1)x
i
x
i
0
and
sign[
i
  
i
0
] = sign[c
i
  c
i
0
]; i; i
0
2 I:
This means that although it produces more crude oil and renes a greater quantity of it,
the integrated rm that has the lower upstream cost will rene less relative to its own
crude production. The reason is that although the lower upstream cost gives it an absolute
advantage in both crude oil production and rening compared to its higher cost integrated
rivals, it also gives it a comparative advantage in upstream crude oil production. It will
therefore tend to specialize more in crude oil production than its higher costs rivals. Hence
the lower 
i
.
The equilibrium determination of 
i
is in fact somewhat more subtle than might ap-
pear at rst sight, since both strategic and cost considerations intervene in the equilibrium
determination of s
i
. To see this, rewrite s
i
as
s
i
= s(n
u
; n
d
;m) +
m  1
A
"
C
I
m
  c
i
#
(20)
where
s(n
u
; n
d
;m) =
1
A
(
(m  1)
"
 + C
I
m+ 1
 
C
I
m
#
 
B
m
(S
I
+X
J
u
)
)
:
The rst term is common to all the integrated rms. For a given  and a given cost vector
(c
1
; c
2
; : : : ; c
n
u
), it depends only on n
u
; n
d
and m. This term captures the \strategic element"
in the determination of s
i
. The second term on the other hand is specic to each rm. It
captures the \cost dierential element" in the determination of s
i
.
11
Quite obviously, the second term can be either positive or negative, depending on whether
the rm has smaller or greater than average upstream cost. For m < n
u
( n
d
), one easily
veries, by numerical examples, that s(n
u
; n
d
;m) may also take positive or negative values,
depending on the relative values of m;n
u
and n
d
. Thus even if all rms had the same
upstream cost, so that the second term would disappear, the integrated rms might all
choose, in equilibrium, to rene more than their own upstream production by buying crude
oil on the market from non-integrated upstream producers (s(n
u
; n
d
;m) < 0). As already
noted, this may seem strange at rst thought, since each of them could supply itself at a cost
which is lower than the equilibrium market price for crude. The reason why this may occur
is that the equilibrium strategy may be one of \raising rivals' costs" (Salop and Scheman,
1983): by buying part of their crude from the market rather than supplying themselves
totally from their upstream division, they contribute to raising the cost of crude for non
integrated downstream rivals and hence reduce their downstream competition.
For such a strategy to be an equilibrium one, the gains to the integrated rm from the
reduced competition on the downstream market must more than oset the cost of supporting
such a strategy, which is given by the upstream loss from buying the crude at a price higher
than its own marginal cost of producing it. For this to occur, the number of non integrated
rms must be large relative to the number of integrated rms. For if the non integrated
downstream rms do not constitute a suciently important part of the downstream market,
than the gains from the reduced downstream competition will be relatively small and will
be spread across a relatively large number of integrated rms
9
.
Notice that the common strategic element s may dominate the individual cost element
for all i. Therefore, even though the value of s
i
will vary across rms, it is theoretically
possible to have s
i
negative or positive for all the integrated rms, as it is possible that it
be negative for some rms and positive for others.
9
For a further discussion of this question and some examples, see Gaudet and Long (1995).
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6 Conclusion
We have proposed a simple model of a partially integrated industry in order to illustrate
the separate eects of strategic and of upstream cost considerations in the determination
of the integrated rm's equilibrium net sales decision to the non integrated sector. The
sum of the two eects for any individual integrated rm may be either negative or positive
in equilibrium. Therefore a particular integrated rm's net position with respect to the
upstream and downstream markets may be one of buyer or seller of the upstream good.
There is however no ambiguity in the eect of upstream cost asymmetries: the integrated
rm with the lower upstream cost will produce more both upstream and downstream than
the one with the higher upstream cost, but its downstream production will be less important
relative to its upstream production.
A casual look at the data suggests that these predictions are conrmed for the world oil
industry. There is clearly room, however, for more sophisticated empirical analysis of this
question. Data permitting, such an analysis might make it possible, for instance, to identify
empirically the strategic and cost elements in the determination of the integrated rms'
market interaction with other upstream and downstream competitors. The model could also
provide a framework for an empirical analysis of other natural resource industries.
13
Appendix
The solution for s
i
and x
j
The rst-order conditions at the upstream stage are
"
(p  c
i
)
@y
i
@w
+ y
i
@p
@w
#
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where, from (5),(8) and (9),
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After substituting for @y
i
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i
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j
, and for p, w and y
i
from (8),
(9) and (5), these rst-order conditions can be rewritten as
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where S
I
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P
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i
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P
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.
Summing (A{3) over i and (A{4) over j, we nd that
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j
. The solution of this system of two equations in S
I
and
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u
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and hence
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From (A{3) and (A{4), the solution for s
i
and x
j
may therefore be written
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Table 1
Output, rening capacity and reserves of top 46 integrated oil producers (1993)
Company Oil production Rening capacity Rening/production Oil Reserves
(1,000 b/d) (1,000 b/d) (mill. bbls)
production rank rening rank ref./prod. rank reserves rank
Saudi Aramco** 8,047 1 1,750 7 0.217 42 261,203 1
NIOC** 3,425 2 1,081 11 0.316 38 92,860 4
Pemex** 3,140 3 1,500 9 0.478 32 50,766 7
CNPC** 2,829 4 300 35 0.106 46 13,599 9
PDV** 2,563 5 2,061 4 0.804 29 64,450 6
RD/Shell 2,133 6 4,197 1 1.968 14 9,124 12
KPC** 1,881 7 670 19 0.356 37 96,500 3
Exxon 1,667 8 3,972 2 2.383 9 6,564 13
NNPC** 1,524 9 400 32 0.262 39 12,585 10
Luk Oil** 1,374 10 556 26 0.405 36 2,801 23
Libya NOC** 1,361 11 570 25 0.419 34 22,800 8
BP 1,242 12 1,907 6 1.535 17 6,537 14
Sonatrach** 1,147 13 474 30 0.683 31 9,200 11
Adnoc** 1,055 14 193 40 0.183 43 64,452 5
Chevron 950 15 2,029 5 2.136 12 4,185 16
Mobil 838 16 2,100 3 2.506 8 3,343 20
Texaco 728 17 1,588 8 2.181 11 2,685 24
Pertamina** 708 18 783 16 1.106 24 5,760 15
Arco 684 19 522 29 0.763 30 2,465 26
Amoco 678 20 1,007 13 1.485 18 2,223 28
Petrobas* 668 21 1,288 10 1.928 15 3,800 17
INOC 619 22 550 27 0.889 27 100,000 2
Elf Aquitaine* 619 23 756 17 1.221 21 2,535 25
ENI** 536 24 1,019 12 1.901 16 3,463 19
EGPC** 502 25 523 28 1.042 25 3,500 18
PDO** 466 26 80 43 0.172 44 2,820 22
Statoil** 449 27 195 39 0.434 34 2,023 30
Conoco 434 28 579 22 1.334 19 1,694 32
Total 430 29 910 14 2.116 13 2,844 21
OGPG** 390 30 63 45 0.162 45 2,445 27
Philips 362 31 355 33 0.981 26 1,037 34
Petronas** 325 32 75 44 0.231 41 1,813 31
YPF** 299 33 354 34 1.184 23 1,005 35
Ecopetrol** 288 34 248 38 0.861 28 2,087 29
Unocal 246 35 296 36 1.203 22 754 37
Amerada Hess 215 36 575 24 2.674 7 670 38
BHP 205 37 95 42 0.463 33 666 39
Norsk Hydro* 190 38 45 46 0.237 40 540 40
Rapsol* 162 39 752 18 4.642 5 412 42
Marathon 156 40 579 22 3.712 6 842 36
Petro-Canada* 121 41 283 37 2.339 10 389 43
Petroecuador** 120 42 148 41 1.233 20 1,500 33
Petrona 92 43 611 21 6.641 4 530 41
Sun 38 44 670 19 17.631 3 55 44
Coastal 14 45 473 31 33.785 2 29 46
Nippon Oil 9 46 810 15 90.000 1 40 45
Note: The asterisk indicates that the company is partly state-owned and the double asterisk that it is fully state-owned.
Source: Petroleum Intelligence Weekly - Special Supplement Issue, December 12, 1994
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